The BJP’s victory was structurally broad, its final scale may have been amplified by UA deletions in specific close contests, but TMC’s losses in Muslim-majority constituencies also point to a genuine political swing. A warning sign that may matter well beyond this election.
A double-engine BJP government could no longer blame West Bengal’s opposition for delays. If New Delhi and Kolkata are aligned, Bangladesh will expect results on both the Ganges and Teesta. The Teesta dispute, long blocked by Mamata Banerjee, is especially symbolic. With the Trinamool Congress out of power, Dhaka would expect movement.
The BJP campaign, like the one in 2021, was conducted in a manner reminiscent of an invasion rather than an election. Television channels and newspapers, many of which are openly and enthusiastically aligned with Modi’s party, framed the elections as a conquest of Bengal by him and Shah and the Hindutva party they lead.
Bangladesh functioned as a mirror in which West Bengal was invited to view itself: Hindu or Muslim, refugee or infiltrator, borderland or nation, Bengali or anti-national.
West Bengal's voters may not have articulated this distinction in theoretical terms. But they felt its weight. The images from Dhaka showed them what the far end of one trajectory looks like.
India’s political field has bent under pressure but has not collapsed. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s political field is far more fragile.
