The Future of Reform

I am unapologetically pro-reform. And this support for reform comes from a liberal perspective where the understanding is protection of rights, end of executive dominance and protection of democracy requires checks and balances which currently doesn’t exist. This is my normative stance.

However, if we try to address a different question, i.e. what is the future of reform or what is the future of the July Charter and if we try to find an answer to this question adopting an objective analytical lens, the normative stance is not enough.

This is when we need to take a critical look at the process through which the reform project unfolded, the political calculation that were considered, and the power dynamics that were at play.

Understanding and analyzing the future of reform requires an objective take. And this is also a learning opportunity as this will tell us what we have done wrong, to what extent and how we can rectify it or what we can do in future.

I have always been critical about the reform process. In the past, i called it an elite-driven process where citizen participation was minimal, where the necessity for reform was not fully explained to the mass and where the aspect of citizen engagement was ignored both by the political parties, the interim government and the consensus commission.

The traditional civil society bodies, often dominated by the economists, never fully realised this call for political reform. In a Prothom Alo interview, I criticised this elite-centric process, in a piece written for CounterPoint, I argued that the success for reform initiatives are quite minimal.

And in our research work for BIGD’s State of Governance Report, we made an argument that the post-refolutionary countries usually chose on of four different pathways, ruptureform (where reform reflects the aspiration of political rupture), symbform (where populist short-lived reforms are introduced that don’t enjoy elite support), palacecraft (where reform is an outcome of elite consensus with minimal to no citizen engagement), and revertform (where reform failed and the country moved back to authoritarianism).

The pathway to be chosen by the country relied on two factors- degree of elite consensus (ranging from consensus to fragmentation) and degree of citizen engagement (which can be either high or low), mediated by the capacity of the transitional government (it’s capacity can be either high or low).

I argued that Bangladesh’s pathway never encouraged citizen involvement and thus, the best we could have was a palacecraft. But the problem, was we didn’t have an elite consensus on the degree, extent or process of reform.

There was a general agreement about the need for reform but there was no agreement among the political parties about specific reforms, contents and the process though which these reforms would be implemented.

It was an asymmetrical political bargain where initially BNP had the upper hand.

Our whole reform initiative was a power play among the political actors. Just think about it -- before the London meeting, BNP didn’t accept any reform proposal and the party started accepting some reform proposals in the post London meeting only after a clear timeline for election became clear.

It allowed the reform discussion to continue but in the process the Interim Government lost its most important bargaining tool- election timeline.

Since then, the control of the political game shifted hands several times. In the absence of citizen involvement, what could be a National issue eventually transformed into round of political games where strategic manoeuvring was adopted periodically by the parties involved.

The initial upper hand was enjoyed by the BNP and hence, the proclamation read as it is now and the note of dissents were incorporated within the July Charter.

The CC and IG got an opportunity to push back when the political parties agreed to give it the power to determine the implementation pathway. It was a strategic move by the CC when it come up with the alternatives while getting rid of the note of dissents.

The IG tried to design a compromise with the July Charter Implementation Order forcing BNP to accept the Constitution Reform Assembly and at least the Upper Chamber with PR.

Eventually, we had a consensus but it was weak, vulnerable and a manufactured consensus. In my opinion, the IG made a strategic move while relying on two assumptions, first, since not accepting this ‘manufactured consensus’ would jeopardize the possibility of having election in time, BNP would grudgingly accept it.

Secondly, the IG took a bet that BNP wouldn’t get a two-thirds majority and since it wouldn’t have the power to amend the constitution, it had to do things through the Constitution Reform Assembly which would require a simple majority, there was an incentive for BNP to accept the outcome of the referendum.

The first assumption worked as BNP initially didn’t reject the order. But over time, the party shower it’s discomfort with the reform package and you don’t need to look very far to understand that, just consider it’s electoral manifesto where the party threw away the idea of proportional representation.

Unfortunately, for the IG, the second assumption didn’t work. Once BNP won with absolute majority, the fate of the reform package was sealed.

The bottom line is, whereas the goal of reforming the political structure is a noble one and has normative value, the process we adopted was extremely problematic, which is now becoming evident.

It was not even a proper ‘palacecraft’ because there was no political consensus and instead it was rounds and rounds of games of asymmetric political bargain, where parties just tried to have the outcome in their favour through strategic manoeuvring with the resources they had at their disposal.

In our BIGD work, we actually predicted that the manufactured consensus wouldn’t last.

If we are lucky we will have a winner’s version of palacecraft with very minimal and somewhat useless reforms and if not, we will go back to revertform.

The question is, what can happen now? Here is what I think: 

As things stand right now, there is no incentive for BNP to change its approach or intention about reform. The party is right now working under a false understanding that the executive needs to ‘exceptionally strong’ to run the country and it is considering the independent institutions as either part of the executive or a threat to a ‘much needed’ executive control.

So, upper house with PR is gone, so are the provisions mentioned in the July Charter for ensuring non-partisan appointment within the constitutional and statutory bodies. 

The party’s action regarding the separate secretariat for the judiciary or the Human Rights Commission indicates that there will be lot of wordplays and intentional effort to implement the agreed-upon provisions mentioned in the July Charter.

Unfortunately, the party is failing to understand that if it continues like that not only its reputation will be harmed but also there will be no possibility of democratic consolidation. We will soon be back to square one.

If BNP’s current stance can’t be challenged, we will not be able to move forward. This challenge has to come from multiple sources, from it’s sympathizers who understand the value of liberal democracy, from the civil society organizations who are supposed to be watchdogs and from the citizens who understand why these reforms are needed and how these will affect their lives.

Let’s not forget that we also need the opposition to play its role.

Like all the political parties of the world, BNP is a rational actor and if it feels that it can get away with minimal or no reform, it will definitely do that.

 That is why, there must be something, be it mobilisation, advocacy or arguments that would show the party how it would harm it, how it would cost it vote, and how this may cause loss of support of critical actors. Only then, the party will change course.

The problem is, (and, fortunately for BNP), it is highly unlikely that a strong challenge will emerge from the main opposition parties. JI, the main opposition party suffers from three problems, first of all, it’s MPs have only surface level understanding of the necessity of reform and up to this point in time, it has failed to make a coherent case.

Just compare the note dissents produced by the Jamaat MPs of the parliamentary special committee with the dissent produced by Barrister Nowshad Zamir of BNP.

Secondly, the party’s stance on our liberation war and women’s issues are unacceptable. Again, just go through its note of dissents and the comments made by its MPs. In our political setup, these are important issues and henceforth, it is unlikely that civil society organizations will consider this party as a legitimate partner in pushing for reform.

Thirdly, whereas the party can mobilize its workers and activists, it is not in a position to reach out to the mass and make them understand the value of reform. So far, they have failed to do that.

NCP may have a better grasp of reform but it still lacks the mobilisation capacity and its close association with JI will always remain a key concern. I don’t see any possibility of a mass movement in support of reform, unless the government makes a mess of the economy.

Nevertheless, we still can have minimal reform -- reform as per what BNP agreed in July Charter and what it promised in its 31 points and Election Manifesto.

The sad reality is, even that will require extensive pressure. It’s possible that the pressure may come from internal sources. My guess is that Barrister Nowshad Zamir is not the only person within the party who understands the need for reform and realises why independent institutions and the judiciary are required.

There can be a repeat of the 1991, when a group of backbenchers created pressure on the top leadership to choose parliamentary democracy over presidential one. Even if this internal group is there, they will need the support of the civil society groups who will move beyond the partisan interest or preference and push for institutional reforms.

As a supporter of substantive reform within the political structure of this country, this dim scenario really makes me sad.

And it also clarifies one thing -- our failure has come from one major shortcoming, and that is, we didn’t reach out to people.

We did not explain to them how an independent ACC will helps them to have a better access to social safety net programs, to schools or markets.

We failed to explain how an independent Human Rights Commission will protect them from abuses by the government party, the law enforcement agencies and other forces.

We failed to make a case for a police commission that would allow law enforcement agencies to behave responsibly.

We failed to explain how every aspect of their lives is connected with state institutions and how reforms can make it better. And the sad thing is, there really was an appetite for change and the overwhelming support for the referendum (which can be roughly translated as a support for change) shows that.

However, this support was implicit and thus, the governing party can risk ignoring it. If the support was explicit, no party, if it wants to be a political party can ignore it.

Having said all of these, my optimist soul believes that this is not the end of reform and this quest for reform will define the future politics of Bangladesh. I hope the new political platforms that are trying to find their places within the political space realize that and start reaching out to people to make the case for reform. 

That can be their new politics, the politics of empathocracy, politics of responsibility and empathy. After all, reform initiatives are means to an end, and that end, building a democratic political order with citizen engagement so that we can build ‘responsible’ political institutions that care for citizens irrespective of their class, religion, or gender identity.

Asif M Shahan is Professor in the Department of Development Studies at University of Dhaka.