Two months Before the Ganges Water Treaty Expires. What Then?

In addition to energy resources, critical minerals and rare earth, it seems water resources have already been wielded as a strategic instrument at this geo-politically challenging time. In the run up to and during the upcoming negotiations on the Ganges Water Treaty (GWT), what approach, in general, should be optimal in securing national interest for Bangladesh?

Present Context

On December 12, 1996, India agreed and the Ganga/Ganges Waters Treaty was signed with the government of Bangladesh. In less than two months from now the treaty will expire.

Negotiations are yet to begin on possible renewal/renegotiation of this very important treaty although Bangladesh constituted a committee for the purpose and conveyed the information to the India side for reciprocal and other preparatory actions. At press time, we know of no such development reported from India.

Factors Behind Signing GWT 

Under the federal structure and as stipulated in the Constitution of the Union of India, water is a state subject in India -- with absolute jurisdiction over water supplies, local water management and sanitation; irrigation, drainage, embankments; and water storage and water power. On the other hand, under Article 253 of the Indian Constitution, the Union Government has the power to make treaties and international agreements.

In 1996, political considerations were prioritized over technical factors and bureaucratic processes in the interest of overall bilateral relations. Consequently, political will was demonstrated at the highest political level and upheld at lower bureaucratic and technical levels during the negotiations throughout the course of 1996 as key to the conclusion of the Treaty. The then government of the state of West Bengal played an astute and positive role.

As a result, the Treaty was signed and problematic issues such as ‘augmentation’ was not allowed to stand in the way, though there is a mention thereof in the treaty.

As per treaty provision, India only shares with Bangladesh data at the Farakka Barrage point though several water works including barrages and dams have been constructed upstream since that substantially disrupt and reduce the Ganges natural flow to Farakka.

Not knowing the negotiating history, it may be surmised that during the negotiation the Bangladesh side did not raise or insist on inclusion of data sharing provision including for upstream water works above Farakka barrage.

Such a provision was included even in the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan.

Over the last 30 years, was this issue raised in any manner, particularly, in official circles? Given the circumstances prevailing now, what view experts hold as to how far raising this issue would benefit Bangladesh?

Under the India-Bangladesh 2011 Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development, Article 2 addresses the issue of sharing of the waters of common rivers and exploring possibilities of common basin management..and so on. Such and other deficiencies need to be underscored for the benefit of posterity.

Article 2 of the Framework Agreement provides: “To enhance cooperation in sharing of the waters of common rivers, both Parties will explore the possibilities of common basin management of common rivers for mutual benefit. The Parties will cooperate in flood forecasting and control. They will cooperate and provide necessary assistance to each other to enhance navigability and accessibility of river routes and ports.”

Clearly, such cooperation cannot not be conceived without participation of other basin members -- in this case -- Nepal. Therefore, a question arises – how Nepal is disposed of in this matter of cooperation for basin-wide management?

Given the overall state of bilateral relations existing between India and Bangladesh and the former’s clear preference for bilateral engagement as opposed to multi-lateral cooperation, raising this issue is liable to mean protracted negotiation and may seem to lose value in view of the short time left before the expiry of the treaty.

Adverse effects of climate change are reflected in different ways on any river system in this part of the world. Of note is the increasing level of melting of the Himalayan glaciers, another is the untimely, disproportionate amount of rainfall in the catchment areas.

Would raising this issue mean that currently available flow is inadequate during the dry season or overwhelming during the monsoon, not because of upstream withdrawal, but because of natural causes i.e. climate change? How much will that approach benefit Bangladesh?

If present dispositions and ground conditions including a certain reticence or silence on the part of India on Dhaka’s request to keep the existing agreement in force until a new one is negotiated allow for a grudging renewal, what are the issues that must be tackled of renegotiating a whole new treaty in this situation?

Renegotiation would give any side scope to raise new, not so new but problematic issues such as augmentation of flow; or say, flow at Farakka versus whole river flow, climatic impact on the river system which boil down to availability and uncertainty of flow that is characterized by some experts as a new reality which must be taken into account.

Some activists wish to bring in, perhaps for good reasons, the new issue of riverine community -- a whole of the society/stakeholders approach for which the available time at hand is perhaps not adequate, nor there is visible, common groundswell and confluence of opinion involving communities on both sides of the border.

Recent Developments

May 22: 90th meeting of the JRC joint technical committee was held in Kolkata. The team went to Farakka and took measurements of flow.

Earlier, in September 2025, the JRC met in New Delhi.

March 6-8, 2025: The 86th meeting of the India-Bangladesh Joint River Commission (JRC) and technical committee on Ganges water sharing was held in Kolkata in West Bengal. The two teams visited the Farakka barrage.

In February 2025, during a meeting with India's External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on the sidelines of the eighth Indian Ocean Conference in Muscat, Oman, the then Bangladesh Foreign Affairs

Advisor "sought to initiate discussions for the renewal of the Ganges Water Treaty signed in 1996."

These meetings are part of the structured engagement under the GWT. The last ministerial level meeting of the Joint River Commission was held on August 25, 2022 in New Delhi, twelve years after the previous one in 2010.

Perhaps, apart from a chronicling of the mundane, inconsequential meetings, the upshot from the information above is -- the infrequent meetings, long gap in between and lack of tangible progress in Bangladesh, make it even more critical and urgent to explore the way forward for negotiation to start on the GWT.

India has already held 4 rounds of stakeholder dialogue as stated by their State Minister, Ministry of External Affairs in the Lok Sabha. Is there any matching performance on this side? At this stage, one goes back to the key question -- whether the treaty will be renewed or renegotiated.

In view of the current situation, following positions/views need attention:

i) The treaty has a provision for renewal, and also can be renegotiated, if both sides agree.

ii) On the availability of flow for sharing, disagreement exists whether the flow available at Farakka point or for the entire river needs to be shared on the basis of an agreed formula. According to researchers, equity would be better served if the whole river flow was taken into account.

iii) Already, a preference for a deal drawing on the 1977 Memorandum of Understanding -- which had a guarantee clause -- is being raised officially and in other quarters.

iv) Another view is that an agreement much shorter than 30 years would be preferable in view of the uncertainty regarding available flow, the climatic effect, and other factors that make the reality change fast;

v) There should be a dispute resolution mechanism built into the agreement involving independent third party;

vi) The principle of sharing data on all dams, barrages, and reservoirs constructed in the upper stretches of the river with downstream countries was not included in GWT and thus was not observed. This time such a provision should be included in an agreement.

vii) Some experts suggest rather than limiting the framework to a bilateral Bangladesh-India treaty, a trilateral agreement involving Bangladesh, India and Nepal should be considered covering the entire Ganges basin. This is in line perhaps with the most talked about ‘basin-wide formula of water resources development’ including sharing of waters of common rivers.

As in 1996, so in 2026, though under very different and difficult ambience surroundings, the bilateral relations of the two countries, an interesting comment recently made by an eminent hydrologist assumes considerable importance. He said: “By 2027, we will reach a stage when the issue of transboundary water must be handled by political leadership rather than by bureaucrats or technocrats.”

That is at the same time a realistic conjecture and a woeful assessment of the deficient, lackluster state of preparation at official apparatuses shouldering so far, the onus of negotiating water sharing agreements or treaties.

As regards the GWT, the idea of political leadership being pivotal underpins the hard fact of diplomatic accommodation. In parallel, another idea is in currency in India -- that of ‘generosity’ which Indian analysts believe has been taken advantage of by labelling it as ‘blackmail’.

Some consider that the treaty can be termed as successful as India strictly complied with the schedule of flows during January-May of a year from the Farakka barrage as mentioned in the treaty. On the contrary, recent data suggests that Bangladesh receives 10-15 percent more water at Hardinge Bridge than what is released from the Farakka barrage.

GWT viewed in the context of Indus Water Treaty (IWT)

What happened as described below before the IWT was signed, indicates the possibility, though remote, of India stopping water flow at Farakka in the case no negotiations were underway and the GWT could not be renewed or renegotiated.

Following the 1947 partition, the Chief Engineers of East Punjab and West Punjab signed an agreement on 20 December 1947, maintaining the status quo ante for the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) and water arrangements at Ferozepore until 31 March 1948.

When this temporary agreement expired with no renewal negotiations underway, Indian authorities ceased water deliveries to Pakistan through two canals passing through Indian territory. From a strictly legal standpoint, India was entirely within its rights to take this action once the bilateral agreement had lapsed.

India is said to have apologized and gave assurance of not stopping water again. The recent history post-Pahelgam incident indicates otherwise.

IWT has no end date, no provision of review or modifications, nor for mediation by third parties. India thinks for the future, the lesson is not to accept diplomatic accommodation without reciprocal commitments.

The Multi-lateral Premise

Historically, multi-lateral instruments underscore the following premises covering rights and obligations of co-riparian states:

• Equitable and reasonable utilization so as not to cause ‘significant harm’ to co-riparian states.
• Equitable and reasonable participation of watercourse states in use, development and protection.
• Right to utilize is juxtaposed with the duty to cooperate in protection and development. Use should be sustainable.

Some factors that need to be taken into account in order to comply with the provisions ensuring the above-mentioned mode of utilization include geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other issues that are natural in character. Among the other factors is the role of sediments -- a concern that needs to be reflected, say Indian analysts.

India and Pakistan are not signatory to 1992 UN Water Convention on protection and use of transboundary watercourses and international lakes, which Bangladesh has signed but no other country from South Asia did. As regards the UN Convention on non-navigational use of international watercourses of 1997, neither India, nor Bangladesh has signed it.

Let us recall that in 1976 Bangladesh raised the Farakka issue at the 31st session of the UN General Assembly. What ensued is well-meaning advice to both sides to resume dialogue-bilateral obviously.

It would not be unwarranted to say that the run up to the expiry of the GWT is fraught with competing priorities, perceptions and power asymmetry fueled by geo-political calculations. A certain breathing space will be required for both sides to go through steps to get to an effective negotiating position. Meanwhile, a legal vacuum must be avoided, even a cleavage can’t be fully discounted.

To prevent this, a new guiding framework starting with a change towards win-win narrative concomitantly undertaking confidence building measures on both sides is always a good idea. Exchange of views between stakeholders at community level alongside data sharing could start through conversation on mutually beneficial areas of concern such as conservation of the Sundarbans. Benefit sharing in the form of re-opening navigable parts of the rivers with construction planned of necessary infrastructure.

On both these issues, there are standing agreements/ MOUs. Also, joint work could start on provisions of the GWT that had not been addressed so far i.e. review of sharing arrangement. This may also take up any issue of discrepancy between releases and arrivals of flow. At the end of the day, mustering political will to strike effective compromise and protect national interest will be valued.

M. Shameem Ahsan is the Former Ambassador and Visiting Research Director at the Osmani Centre for Peace and Security Studies (OCPASS).