We Must Make BIG-B Work for Bangladesh Primarily

Public attention has recently been drawn to the Japanese-Bangladesh joint development initiative, known as the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B), an ambitious infrastructure and industrial development framework involving investments estimated at approximately US$14 billion.

Its major components include two 600-megawatt coal-fired power units at Matarbari, a proposed deep-sea port, and the Moheshkhali-Matarbari Integrated Infrastructure Development Initiative (MIDI), encompassing transportation, logistics, and industrial facilities.

The broader objective is to establish an industrial and logistics hub connecting Bangladesh with international markets.

So far, so good. However, a fundamental question arises when the proposed regional connectivity is extended to India’s northeastern states.

In principle, regional connectivity can benefit all participating countries through trade, investment and industrialization. However, before contemplating such an arrangement, Bangladesh must undertake a comprehensive assessment of its economic, logistical, administrative and, above all, national security implications.

Cargo volume and tonnage, permissible vehicle dimensions and weight, road and bridge capacities, customs inspection and clearance, security surveillance, border management, maintenance expenditure, operational responsibilities and jurisdiction are among the issues requiring careful examination.

We should have no disagreement with Japan over its development partnership with Bangladesh. Japan has been a trusted development partner for decades. However, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and security must take precedence over all other considerations.

India’s Record and the Question of Reciprocity

India has unfortunately not demonstrated the consistency and reciprocity expected of a trusted neighbour. Several longstanding bilateral issues remain unresolved, while relations deteriorated considerably during the interim administration of Dr Muhammad Yunus.

India’s continued sheltering of ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and a number of her former associates has become a major irritant.

Their political activities and pronouncements from Indian territory, perceived in Bangladesh as attempts to destabilize the country, raise serious questions about India’s commitment to non-interference in our domestic affairs.

These are not merely political disagreements; they have direct implications for our national security.

In April 2025, India unilaterally withdrew the transshipment facility that had allowed Bangladeshi export cargo to use Indian land customs stations en route to Indian seaports and airports.

The sharing of transboundary river waters, particularly the Teesta, also remains unresolved despite Bangladesh’s longstanding efforts to secure an equitable arrangement.

There are equally serious security concerns. We have substantial grounds to believe that foreign involvement has played a role in sustaining the armed insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). External support to insurgent elements, including arms, assistance and sanctuary, cannot be overlooked in our national security calculations. The territorial integrity of Bangladesh is non-negotiable.

Against this background, extending strategic connectivity to India requires careful reconsideration.

There is no denying that BIG-B could offer enormous economic and strategic advantages to India. Its northeastern states, geographically separated from mainland India by the narrow Siliguri Corridor, could gain easier access to maritime trade through Bangladesh.

This would facilitate industrialization, reduce transportation costs and open new commercial opportunities.

For India, access to the Bay of Bengal through Bangladesh would also provide an additional maritime gateway and strengthen its regional economic and strategic reach.

But what would Bangladesh gain in return? Would the benefits be proportionate to the concessions required? Would India guarantee uninterrupted transit and reciprocal access? Would it address our outstanding bilateral concerns?

Connectivity cannot be a one-way street. Strategic advantages cannot be handed over without corresponding benefits and assurances. There is no free lunch.

Bangladesh’s Strategic Asset

The Bay of Bengal has increasingly emerged as an arena of geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic competition. The United States, China, India, Japan and Russia all have significant, sometimes competing, interests in this maritime region.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) framework, particularly championed by Japan and supported by the United States, India and Australia, gives the Bay an important place in the wider Indo-Pacific strategic architecture.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including proposed regional connectivity involving China, Myanmar and Bangladesh, offers economic opportunities but also carries geopolitical implications.

Bangladesh must navigate these competing interests without becoming an instrument of any power bloc. Our foreign policy must remain independent, pragmatic and firmly anchored in the national interest.

Our geographical location, connecting South Asia with Southeast Asia, gives us considerable strategic importance. The Bay’s maritime resources, fisheries, emerging blue economy and potentially valuable seabed mineral deposits represent enormous long-term opportunities. These assets require systematic exploration and protection.

As Dr Yunus once remarked, Bangladesh is the guardian of the oceans. This was not merely a rhetorical observation; it reflected the strategic importance of our maritime geography and its potential for future prosperity.

Our Wider Security Vulnerabilities

Our strategic calculations must also take account of internal and regional security challenges.

Bangladesh continues to host more than one million Rohingya refugees in Cox’s Bazar under increasingly difficult humanitarian conditions. Declining international assistance and the absence of any immediate prospect of safe repatriation place an enormous economic, social and security burden on the country.

The growing influence of the Arakan Army in Myanmar’s Rakhine State and repeated security incidents along our southeastern border are additional concerns. The CHT insurgency and external involvement in sustaining armed elements further threaten regional stability and our territorial integrity.

These vulnerabilities demonstrate why we must exercise exceptional caution before assuming additional regional security responsibilities or opening strategic infrastructure to extensive transit arrangements.

What Exactly was Agreed in Tokyo?

The recent Bangladesh-Japan summit in Tokyo agreed to elevate BIG-B into a broader framework titled “BIG-B for Shared Prosperity”, envisaging expanded cooperation in connectivity, disaster preparedness, geopolitical risk management, economic development and regional stability.

However, subsequent statements have generated considerable public discussion.

State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humaiun Kobir categorically stated on October 30 that no third country was involved in the Bangladesh-Japan discussions and that no arrangement concerning India’s northeastern states had been negotiated.

On the other hand, Indian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal indicated that the strengthened Japan-Bangladesh cooperation would also reinforce the Japan-India partnership, including projects involving India’s northeastern states.

These statements require clarification. Complementary Japanese initiatives with Bangladesh and India should not be confused with an agreement granting India access to Bangladesh’s strategic infrastructure under BIG-B. Any third-country arrangement must be separately negotiated and explicitly approved by Bangladesh.

Bangladesh Must Negotiate from a Position of Strength

There is no reason for Bangladesh to oppose regional economic integration. Indeed, we can emerge as a major regional economic and logistics hub, provided our national interests remain paramount.

Any future arrangement must guarantee reciprocity, clearly defined financial and operational responsibilities, enforceable security safeguards, customs sovereignty and Bangladesh’s right to regulate or suspend transit when national security demands it.

More importantly, we cannot compartmentalize domestic security concerns from foreign policy decisions. International agreements do not operate in a political vacuum. The prevailing state of bilateral relations, the conduct of neighbouring countries and their respect for our sovereignty must form an integral part of our decision-making.

Before extending BIG-B to India, outstanding bilateral issues must be addressed through meaningful dialogue and mutually acceptable arrangements. We must not grant strategic advantages first and hope for reciprocal cooperation later.

The Bay of Bengal is not merely a geographical body of water surrounding Bangladesh. It is one of our most valuable strategic assets and potentially the foundation of our future prosperity.

We must neither squander this opportunity nor allow others to determine its future for us. Bangladesh must remain the principal architect of its own maritime destiny.

Our national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security are non-negotiable.

Ashraf ud doula is a former Secretary and Ambassador.