The winners and losers, and those in between, in the aftermath of the February 12 polls
What did the February 12 elections mean for the future of Bangladesh?
Bangladesh has debated itself intensely this season . Now the debate shifts from imagination to implementation. Dhaka is not beyond saving. But it will not be saved by manifestos alone.
A Yunus presidency could arguably benefit Bangladesh considerably. Despite domestic criticism from certain groups, he continues to command considerable respect internationally, and no other Bangladeshi figure possesses comparable global stature
The new government will need to deal with a range of issues related to transitional justice, to include accountability, truth, healing, and (ultimately) reconciliation.
What Dr. Yunus and his team of advisers stepped into was not a functioning state awaiting a caretaker, it was institutional wreckage requiring reconstruction. What followed was a period of institution-building that, whatever its imperfections, deserves recognition.
For all its organizational strength (its cradle-to-grave welfare systems, disciplined cadres, and efficient disaster response), Jamaat serves a problematic end: It is in the service of creating a theocracy from the bottom up.
The question now is not only how America will wield its power, but how the rest of the world will respond to a superpower increasingly guided by transactional interests rather than shared norms.
Banning the AL has led to a vacuum filled by the Jamaat-e-Islami, now the second largest party and arguably stronger and more hopeful than ever about transforming Bangladesh into an Islamic state.
One of the core reasons behind Bangladesh’s political malaise is blind partisan loyalty. The tendency to select candidates based on party identity, factional allegiance, religion, or gender -- rather than competence -- has repeatedly rendered parliament ineffective. The entire nation has paid the price.
Opponents of the referendum write as though rejecting this package will clear the way for a more measured, item by item process of constitutional improvement. But nothing in Bangladesh’s recent history suggests that such a sequence will materialize on its own.
Jamaat can only win if this is a wave election, signaling a tectonic shift in the national mood. There is little evidence of this in the polls and available data. It is possible, but not probable.
The question is not whether this election will solve all of Bangladesh’s problems, it will not. The real question is whether it can reopen a democratic pathway that has long been blocked.
Bangladesh’s citizens face a crucial choice: Will they allow the state to bypass constitutional limits, pressure institutions, and control the vote, or will they insist that the Constitution not the government remains the ultimate authority?
While turnout may not reach historic highs, it is nonetheless expected that up to 70% of voters will participate. Yet, as election day draws near, a palpable sense of anxiety and security concern has settled over the public.
Bangladesh has tremendous potential to grow both economically and institutionally but the growth depends on the trust that people and investors place in its institutions, and that trust is nurtured through elections that are fair, transparent, and conducted with integrity.
