My Prediction About the Election
Jamaat can only win if this is a wave election, signaling a tectonic shift in the national mood. There is little evidence of this in the polls and available data. It is possible, but not probable.
I wrote in the past that JI’s vote share has increased and I stand by that assessment. Different surveys conducted over the last few weeks indicate that JI has the support of 30 to 35 percent of voters.
But there is a bigger question: since the election is held under the first-past-the-post system (FPTP), does that mean that with this vote share, JI will be able to come to power? Will their vote share, even if it increases a bit, lead to a gain of 150+ parliamentary seats?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to discuss about election typologies.
Political scientists have divided elections into various types -- normal election, deviating election, realigning election, wave election.
There are few other types, but for Bangladesh’s case, I concentrate on the aforesaid ones and I think it’s necessary to understand this classification.
In case of normal election, the usual party structure and party system doesn’t go through any deviation. The party loyalists remain true to their party identity and they don’t change camps. The swing voters consider several factors like local candidates’ name recognition, anti-incumbency, etc and the election doesn’t reflect major change.
The deviating election, on the other hand, indicates a temporary shift in case of party loyalty where a major frustration forces party supporters to choose its opponents. This is, however, a temporary shift -- essentially a ‘vote of anger’ and the party loyalists soon come back to their original choice, most likely in the next election.
The realigning election, on the other hand, indicates a permanent shift -- a breakdown of party coalition, a permanent shift in party loyalty or new issues or ideas replace the issues that currently divide the parties.
Finally, wave election is responsible for national level upsets. In this type of election, there appears a ‘national mood’ that sways the whole country. The voters overwhelmingly vote for a particular party or its idea, ignoring everything else.
Let me just briefly compare and contrast three critical types of election: deviating, realigning, and wave.
Deviating election mainly refers to micro-level change in voting behaviour, which may cause a decline in a party’s seat share, but may not result in a national upset.
Realigning means a a permanent shift of a chunk of voters or emergence of a new class of voters who continuously keep voting for a party until another realignment takes place.
Now, the key question for predicting the winner of this election is: what type of election we are observing?
I am relying on the quantitative survey results and field studies that attempt to provide a deep insight about voter behaviour and choices.
Based on what I have seen, this is not a realigning election.
I have not seen any major permanent ideological shift among the voters, and in fact, voters who are shifting from one party to another are making that decision based on frustration and anger and it is very unlikely that it will be a permanent shift.
It is possible that many AL voters will go out to vote, but they will do so because they have been forced to make a choice. If they get their party back, they will swing back.
For me, this election is a combination of normal and deviating elections. Normal in the sense that a large number of party loyalists are likely to remain within their trusted home and the swing voters (a significant number of them are probably moving towards a certain direction) are making the movement.
It is deviating in the sense that a part of the party loyalist are changing their minds and choosing a different party. But that shift so far is unlikely to cause a wave.
Let me spell it out: in the post-August 5 period, BNP’s party machinery has done a terrible job.
The petty leaders, almost everywhere in the country were involved with corruption, bribery and extortion. And people are really, really pissed off.
In fact, sitting in Dhaka, it is extremely difficult to understand how frustrated people are with BNP.
So, at the micro-level, there is a shift -- a large part of the swing voters took with them a chunk of BNP loyalists and that is why we are observing a Jamaat surge.
But is that surge a wave?
I doubt that. And here is why.
First of all, traditionally BNP’s base is larger and stronger than Jamaat, and BNP, from an organizational perspctive, is stronger than JI. So, even if BNP loses a part of its base to Jamaat (the deviation), its base still remains bigger.
So, when you add up BNP defectors with swing voters that moved to Jamaat, it shows a strong surge from 12% (its historical high) to around 35% -- no doubt a massive swing -- but it probably is not enough.
Why isn’t it enough?
Because, even though JI gained the independents and part of BNP, it still couldn’t convince all the potential BNP defectors and the undecideds. This is the second point.
Why is that so?
Simply because the party didn’t have the adequate structure and enough quality candidates to nominate in different divisions/ constituencies.
If you look at Jamaat’s coalition calculation, it becomes clear that the party is betting on having a strong performance in three divisions -- Rajshahi, Khulna, and Rangpur.
The party itself is not so confident about other divisions.
If you compare the two parties' nomination process, you can see the difference.
BNP in most cases relied on their old guards -- banking on name recognition -- and Jamaat went for new names, their trusted leaders who performed well in the past. But since the number of those leaders are quite limited, they had to rely on relatively unknown candidates while pushing the narrative that these are ‘honest leaders.’
Now, what is the outcome of that?
In my opinion, by relying on the old guards, BNP managed to stop an en maase defection from its ranks and also forced the undecideds to think again.
In the areas, where the old guards are facing a relatively well-known Jamaat leader, they are facing problems. But that number is not significant, especially beyond the three divisions mentioned above -- and when an old guard is facing a not-well known Jamaat figure, he is enjoying an advantage.
Thirdly, I consider the voters as rational actors.
To an urban educated voter, the ‘honest ruler’ argument resonates, because they considers it as a change.
But for a rural voter, that change is not always a desirable thing. A rural voter understands life is not an ideal one and honesty cannot always give him access to safety net services or other benefits.
He is well connected with the existing informal network, he knows how an MP can be useful within that network and that is why, he is unlikely to bet on something new.
Now, consider the dilemma of a voter -- he is angry becaue of the BNP activities, he hates what is going on and he wants to vote for the other party.
In some seats, they make that shift. In the others, when he considers the other party, he finds that the party doesn’t offer a clear plan other than presenting itself as an ‘alternative’ -- an ‘honest ruler’ -- and he doesn’t know enough about the candidate to decide whether he is really honest or just bluffing.
In contrast, he finds an old guard -- someone he knows, knows how he works and how to reach him.
Grudgingly, he chooses the devil he knows.
However, in some places, while choosing the old guard, he finds that the party itself is divided, and he gets confused again. This is the dilemma the voters are facing now.
Now, if you think about it, in this scenario, the difference (in case of seats won) between the two parties should be quite low. As, with a big part of the swing voters joining a part of the BNP defectors, the difference between the two parties will be quite insignificant. It will be a nail-biting finish with an absolute uncertainty.
And within this situation, to further complicate the matter, enters the AL voters.
I have said it in the past and will say it again -- this election will be decided by the AL voters and they will be the king makers.
Now, the thing is -- we don’t know the actual size of the AL voters.
BIGD’s July 2025 survey suggests that there are at least 5-7% AL voters who will remain committed to the party and will never shift.
And beyond this small yet significant group, there are significant others who either refused to disclose their choice or are still undecided.
One Innovision survey showed around 15%+ support for AL, with around 40% of the total respondents either refusing to reveal their preference or remaining undecided.
We don’t know what is the percentage of AL voter, but we can safely assume that at a minimum it is 20-25% and can be even more than that.
I am guessing the hardcore loyalists will not come out to vote, but that means there are at least 20% AL voters who may decide to vote.
Think about it: the AL votes are not equally distributed in all constituencies.
In some constituency, AL’s vote share will 90%, in some it will 40-50% and in some it will be 10%.
In a closely contested election, even a 10% swing will decide the fate of a candidate.
The big question is: will they go out and vote? Considering the local context and politics, I think other than the hardcore supporters, the rest will go given that they are convinced about security.
And then, the next question is: if they come out, who will they vote for?
Different surveys show that so far the ALers are breaking for BNP and our field research also supports that. They are doing that not because they feel ideologically aligned with BNP but because they feel that BNP will form the government and they will need the MP to get access to services.
However, in the areas, where they don’t feel connected to the old guards and/or faced significant harassment from BNP, they may abstain or even vote for Jamaat.
In fact, we have seen voters who are flirting with the idea of voting for Jamaat. At the same time, if they feel that JI will form the government, they may shift to JI.
The key thing is, they want to be with the winner and that is why, so far, their choice is BNP.
The way I see it, there is only one pathway for JI win and that is if this election is a wave election, i.e. if the national mood is completely in favour of Jamaat, people are convinced with the party, and they have significantly embraced the party’s vision.
In other words, irrespective of class, gender, education, income level, voters have decided to vote for JI.
That is possible but so far, I have not seen any indication of that.
Of course, we will hear lot of anecdotes that people who didn’t in the past vote for Jamaat are now voting for it, but isn’t that normal? Without that shift, how can the vote share reach up to 30-35%?
But that is probably still not enough for forming a government. Because if you look at the data that projects a very competitive election, it also shows that JI’s support varies considerably across class, age, gender, and education level. And region.
It is still not a wave and the surge is still regional: not a national phenomenon.
So, here goes my scenario-based projection:
Scenario 1: Let’s assume that AL voters stay home -- turnout will be just over 50 or max 60% and we will see a very close fight. In this scenario, BNP is likely to win a plurality thanks to people’s faith in old guards and JI’s inability to find good candidates in every region or seat.
Scenario 2: AL voters come out to vote and the majority of them vote for BNP. BNP will have a simple majority quite comfortably.
Scenario 3: AL voters come out in large numbers and overwhelmingly support BNP in most seats. In this case, BNP can have a two-thirds majority.
Scenario 4: It is a wave election, and most of the voters have decided to vote for JI, ignoring all other factors. A highly unlikely but still possible scenario -- and in this case, JI will win and even win big.
Overall, this election is far from over but, in my opinion, Advantage BNP.
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Asif Shahan
Asif M Shahan, PhD Associate Professor, Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka
