Jamaat Didn’t Miss Its Moment. It Rewrote Its Political Future

Mashrur Arefin’s essay presents Jamaat’s 2026 election performance as a moral and symbolic collapse. But that framing reads less like neutral analysis and more like a projection of personal preference presented as political theory. 

A sober reading of the numbers and political context leads to a very different conclusion. Jamaat did not miss its moment. It achieved its strongest electoral performance in history under conditions that would have eliminated most political organizations.

Jamaat’s Performance in Context

As late as June 2024, one month before the July uprising, many commentators believed Jamaat had been politically extinguished. The party had endured a level of repression unmatched in modern Bangladeshi politics: execution of top leadership, deregistration, confiscation of its electoral symbol, closure of offices nationwide, enforced disappearances, mass arrests, and systematic destruction of affiliated institutions.

Despite this, Jamaat rebuilt its network and entered the election with organizational coherence intact.

Critics often cite Jamaat’s earlier 4 percent vote share as evidence of marginal relevance. What they omit is that Jamaat contested only about 30 of 300 seats in that election. Extrapolating nationwide weakness from partial participation is analytically dishonest.

In 2026, Jamaat and its alliance secured over 37% of the popular vote, won 77 parliamentary seats, and lost dozens more by narrow margins. In most democracies, that level of support would be enough to form a government. Calling this outcome a failure ignores scale, trajectory, and historical comparison. This is Jamaat’s best performance ever, a tripling of its peak vote share and a near quadrupling of its parliamentary presence.

Disappointment at not forming government is understandable. But declaring the result a collapse is not analysis. It is rhetoric.

Electoral Geography Matters

Jamaat’s vote pattern followed predictable demographic lines. The party struggled in Awami League strongholds with consolidated minority voting blocs, but performed competitively in traditional BNP territories:

In none of the three constituencies of Gopalganj district, known as an Awami League stronghold, were Jamaat or the alliance candidates able to secure even second place. The same situation appeared in Moulvibazar, Sunamganj, and Habiganj. However, in most constituencies of Bogura, Feni, Lakshmipur, and Noakhali, considered BNP strongholds, the Jamaat alliance fought nearly neck and neck.

This is not evidence of collapse. It is evidence of regional consolidation and expanding competitive reach.

On the Nine Reasons

The Last Refuge Narrative

Describing religious imagery as inherently suspect and claiming that beard, cap, and robe politics cannot inspire trust into cultural stereotyping. Millions of Bangladeshi voters are visibly religious. Reducing that symbolism to moral arrogance says more about the observer than the electorate.

There is also no documented evidence that Jamaat campaigned on a promise of “vote for us and secure heaven.” That slogan has been repeatedly attributed but never substantiated. Serious analysis requires verifiable claims, not caricatures.

YouTuber Intimidation Culture

Blaming a party for the tone of loosely affiliated influencers is speculative. Jamaat’s vote share increased to historic levels. The claim that online aggression alienated voters contradicts the electoral outcome itself. Personal discomfort with digital rhetoric cannot substitute for measurable political evidence.

Women and Representation

The assumption that women would reject Jamaat was disproven by voting data. Electoral behavior should be measured empirically, not ideologically assumed. As Nazmul Ahsan, executive editor of Netra News, observed:

“There were other surprises. The assumption that women voters would automatically reject Jamaat because of its rhetoric, or its failure to nominate female candidates, did not quite hold. A Netra News analysis of more than 1,600 single-sex polling stations outside Dhaka found that, in the centers Jamaat carried, female-only stations outnumbered male-only ones. The BNP’s ratio skewed more male, at roughly 6:4. A new cohort of socially conservative women, often visibly religious, appears to be finding a sense of belonging and community in Jamaat’s message.”

This suggests that a growing bloc of socially conservative women views Jamaat as a vehicle of identity and belonging rather than exclusion. Any serious analysis must engage with this reality rather than substitute assumptions for evidence.

Mob Violence

Jamaat leadership publicly condemned mob actions, including the demolition of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s residence. The party chairman did so early and at personal political cost. Claims of silence are demonstrably false and easily contradicted by official statements.

Contradictions on India

Calling for mutual respect while avoiding confrontation is not contradiction. It is standard diplomatic positioning. Nearly every party in South Asia balances sovereignty rhetoric with pragmatic cooperation. Framing this as hypocrisy imposes a false binary.

Minority Inclusion

Jamaat nominated minority candidates and attempted outreach. Its limited success among minority voters reflects long-standing polarization in Bangladeshi politics, not categorical exclusion. Treating electoral outcomes as proof of doctrinal hostility oversimplifies a complex social landscape.

Attacks on Media

Jamaat condemned the attacks on major newspapers, and its representatives participated in solidarity vigils. Ignoring these documented actions weakens the credibility of the accusation and suggests selective reporting.

1971 and Historical Memory

The election results indicate that many voters prioritized present governance over inherited narratives. Candidates connected to families prosecuted under past tribunals won decisively. This does not erase 1971. It signals a generational shift in how history is politically weighted. The electorate demonstrated that historical memory alone is no longer a sufficient organizing principle.

Alliance Politics

Coalition-building is normal democratic strategy. To condemn alliance politics while expecting ideological purity is inconsistent. The alliance expanded Jamaat’s reach and nearly produced a governing majority. That is evidence of strategic success, not moral failure.

Democratic Conduct After the Election

Jamaat conceded defeat, congratulated the incoming government, and committed to parliamentary cooperation while legally challenging disputed seats. This dual approach respects democratic stability while defending electoral accountability. It reflects institutional maturity, not grievance politics.

Mashrur Arefin frames the election as a moral rejection of Jamaat. The numbers suggest something else. Jamaat transitioned from a persecuted marginal force into a major national contender. One may oppose Jamaat politically and still acknowledge the scale of that transformation.

Calling a historic expansion a missed moment does not describe reality. It describes disappointment that the electorate did not behave as expected.

A healthy democratic culture requires analysts to confront facts even when those facts complicate personal narratives.

Dr Mohammad Nakibur Rahman is a professor of Finance at the University of North Carolina and the US spokesperson for Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh.