The Two-Term Itch

June 25 was a slightly tragicomic day for me in the current fast and packed political calendar. It was tragic because something that was not so favorable for the reforms of the state occurred. It was comic because this exact thing was predicted by some of my fellow politicos many months ago.

When something like this happens, as foretold, to the letter, it is an absurdist comedy. I am referring to BNP’s conditional acceptance of a lifetime limit of two terms in the Prime Ministerial office for an individual. 

Early in this year, when the main reform proposals were floated into the public domain, some of us were very surprised at the hoopla surrounding the lifetime, two-term limit proposal. We thought that not only is this somewhat of a red herring, but it may also be counterproductive because BNP, the main party in the reform negotiations, may just accept this as a bargain for other critical reforms that are not to its liking.

It looks like exactly what we feared has just happened. 

Surprisingly, many esteemed friends who we expect to know better jumped on the two-term bandwagon, as if this were the ultimate anti-Hasina vaccine for the republic -- the reform that encapsulates the spirit of the July Uprising. There are many reasons why we thought the two-term limit is a red herring.  These reasons have been elaborated upon in numerous articles and social media posts, but I will briefly discuss some of them here.

The two-term limit does not actually solve the problem of authoritarian governance during the terms. In fact, in the unlikely scenario of two-term limits actually sticking, this may make a prime minister more predatory and rapacious in governing the country. Since there is no day after tomorrow, a cushy retirement in Dubai or North America will become more enticing.

There is also the lame duck effect of term-limited chief executives. Final term performance of state leaders, even in established democracies, is generally lackluster. Moreover, term limits take away people’s freedom of choice in the parliamentary system, and this is why they are not a feature in Westminster-style democracies.

More importantly, in our country's context, it is hard to see how two-term limits can be a hard constraint to overcome by populist leaders. Currently, it is a panacea in our minds because the nightmare of the frequently promising-to-retire Sheikh Hasina, who has been in power for so long, is still fresh in our memories.

Even in this stark case of presentism, we saw how quickly the hype of the Yunus government continuing for five more years without an election was spread around slyly and cynically. As if not having free and fair elections was not the root of all evils of the Hasina regime’s final years! 

We have seen time and again in our history that a powerful leader, armed with sufficient institutional power, can create threats and enemies to the nation and amass uncontrolled power. Shahbagh and its aftermath come to mind promptly.

However, even BAKSAL is an apt example. It is not difficult to imagine, in a counterfactual scenario, that if the socioeconomic conditions of Bangladesh had not been so dire in 1974-75, even BAKSAL, with its indefinite Presidential tenure, might have lasted far longer. During a future good economic cycle, a leader with sufficient parliamentary power may be able to tear apart the two-term limit as easily as a paper chain. And the masses will be cheering.

However, the beauty of the two-term limit reform is that it is flashy, easy to understand, and easy to sell. Now that the two-term itch is scratched and gone, its time to do a stock-taking of the reform players.  

I do not blame BNP at all for accepting this as a tradeoff. Accepting this will most probably take the wind out of the sails of its most vehement detractors.

I blame the other political parties for promoting this panacea, and I blame the Consensus Commission for creating a smorgasbord of reforms without a clear structure or hierarchy. Silliest of all is the tick-mark list approach to tallying reforms.

There is a hierarchy in reform proposals. Some reforms are more critical, while others are secondary. We should evaluate reform proposals both individually and holistically to determine how they can address fundamental problems, including free and fair elections, accountable governance, and the issue of winner-take-all election victories and terms. Some reforms can be more seminal and provide more cover for the problems. Proportional representation in the Upper House is one such, but more on that in a later article.

BNP has masterfully played the reform game so far, but perhaps it appears masterful because its counterparts in the negotiations have been so amateurish and ill-prepared. Observers cannot but notice that, since August 5, while some political sides have excelled in social media storms and others in street agitations, only the BNP excelled in high politics of the state.

Therefore, congratulations once again to BNP for winning this round of reforms, which is more akin to a grandmaster winning a school chess tournament.