Kaladan Smokescreen: India’s Response to Yunus’s Northeast Vision

Since Prof. Muhammad Yunus’s visit to China and his pointed reference to India’s Northeast, alongside his bold articulation of Bangladesh as the “guardian of the ocean” and a future hub for Chinese business, South Block has not slept easy.

The Nobel laureate’s remarks, though delivered with characteristic calm, were anything but casual. They signaled a quiet but profound shift in strategic imagination, one that repositions Bangladesh, not India, as the nucleus of regional connectivity in the Bay of Bengal.

But as the Bihar elections loom in November 2025, Delhi’s attention was quickly hijacked by a conveniently timed false-flag “terrorist” attack from Pakistan, escalating into a short but messy standoff.

A standoff that perhaps spiraled further than intended. In the aftermath, New Delhi has scrambled for a safer regional narrative, and found it in the ever-useful Kaladan Multimodal Transit Project -- dutifully amplified by its Godi media chorus.

Kaladan: India’s Northeast Fantasy Project

In the wake of the India–Pakistan standoff, Godi media outlets (including The Print, Republic, and Times Now) have hyped the Kaladan corridor as a masterstroke of strategic foresight. The story goes: India will bypass the Siliguri Corridor, open a deep-water port in Sittwe, connect seamlessly to Mizoram, and transform the economic fortunes of the Northeast.

But behind the sleek broadcast packages and glowing graphics lies a harsh truth: India doesn’t even control the corridor.

Fifteen years after the project was first approved in 2008, it remains incomplete. Bureaucratic delays, failed contractors, and bad planning are part of the problem. But the deeper issue is geographic control. The 110-kilometre stretch connecting Paletwa to Zorinpui passes through territory effectively under the control of the Arakan Army (AA), the powerful ethnic armed group in Rakhine.

The AA Factor and Washington's Invisible Hand

Here’s what The Print and others conveniently omit: the Arakan Army is no fringe militia. Its leadership is reportedly operating out of the United States, and there is credible speculation of deep state patronage from Washington. According to independent observers and leaked regional assessments, US strategic interest in the region is increasingly routed not through India, but through Bangladesh, particularly via Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, where robust humanitarian infrastructure is already in place.

The Pentagon never asked for a Myanmar foothold via India. Instead, its focus appears to be the establishment of humanitarian and logistical corridors through Bangladesh, precisely why Prof. Yunus’s strategic framing of the Northeast and the Bay of Bengal corridor struck a nerve in Delhi.

India and the junta’s joint Operation Sunrise may have looked like a tactical win in 2019, but the map has since flipped. The Myanmar military regime is now on the verge of collapse, and the so-called "insurgents," the Arakan Army are, in many places, de facto rulers. Worse still, India backed the wrong horse, and the AA hasn’t forgotten.

The situation becomes even more complicated considering India’s own separatist groups operating along the same border; NSCN factions, ULFA, and various Manipuri armed outfits, many of whom have historically cooperated with or received shelter from the AA.

So yes, Delhi may dream of using the Kaladan corridor for trade and strategic access, but the truth is this: India’s collaboration with the junta has seriously compromised its ability to operate in AA-controlled zones, and its own Northeast rebel movements are watching closely, some from just across the border.

The Rohingya Corridor: UN’s Game

Amid looming famine concerns and UN warnings of displacement-related instability, the United Nations is lobbying for a humanitarian corridor from Bangladesh into Rakhine State. The purpose? To manage an unfolding food crisis and start repatriating nearly one million Rohingya Muslims, currently in Bangladesh.

This is a demographic India has historically viewed as a national security threat. If repatriated, the population numerically far exceeding the 30,000-strong Arakan Army, would completely reshape Rakhine’s political landscape, potentially neutralizing Indian influence in the corridor.

Instead of engaging constructively, Delhi has taken a backseat, instead provoking Bangladeshi political allies, old and new, and aligned civil groups to oppose the corridor in Dhaka, a distraction tactic that plays well on TV but solves nothing on the ground.

And if the AA, which controls the territory, decides to tax or blockade Indian shipments, or even worse, reroute them to their own advantage, India has little leverage. After all, India’s Kaladan infrastructure was built in collaboration with the Junta, not with the Arakan resistance, which now dominates.

China: The Real Puppet Master in Myanmar

Then there’s the elephant in the room: China.

Beijing arms everyone the Junta, the AA, and even other ethnic militias. It has secured deep roots in Myanmar’s strategic infrastructure through projects like the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). These routes are functioning, secure, and deeply integrated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In contrast, Kaladan is limping.

China’s regional posture has only hardened since the recent India–Pakistan skirmish. The Lalmonirhat airbase, near the Bangladesh-India border, has reportedly drawn interest from Beijing. According to multiple regional analysts, this would allow China to flank India on its eastern corridor, right where Delhi thought it was building strength. To top it off, China unilaterally renamed 27 locations in Arunachal Pradesh just days after the India–Pakistan standoff, sending a clear signal of its multi-front pressure strategy.

Even If India Finishes Kaladan ... Then What?

Let’s imagine, somehow, that India does complete the Kaladan corridor. Will it transform the economy of Northeast India?

Highly unlikely.

-- The road runs through foreign-controlled and conflict-ridden zones.

-- The Sittwe port, though deep-water, doesn’t solve India’s own internal Northeast bottlenecks -- such as poor intra-state highways, lack of industrial hubs, and weak integration with national supply chains.

-- The total investment of $500 million+ into the corridor remains vulnerable to sabotage, conflict, or even a simple policy shift from Washington or Beijing.

India would be pouring money into a pipeline that can be switched off by actors it doesn’t influence.

Moreover, Mizoram, Tripura, and Manipur lack the industrial infrastructure needed to actually utilize this corridor. Without parallel investment in logistics parks, export zones, and local production, Kaladan becomes a glorified road to nowhere.

Strategic Brilliance or Strategic Blunder?

The Kaladan Multimodal Project is not a symbol of strategic foresight. It’s a case study in hubris without control, ambition without groundwork.

It is now held hostage by:

-- The Arakan Army, whose cooperation cannot be assumed.

-- Chinese omnipresence, capable of flipping the switch from either end.

-- UN-backed humanitarian priorities, which Delhi neither supports nor leads.

-- Repatriated Rohingya, who may radically reshape Rakhine’s demography and alliances not favorable for India for its treatment of Muslims

-- An economically unprepared Northeast, still disconnected from India’s industrial base.

-- Unviable freight costs across a long, unstable route that doesn’t yet justify the investment.

-- The same corridor could facilitate insurgent backflow, arms trafficking, and renewed instability in India’s Northeast a ticking time bomb disguised as connectivity.

As the Sittwe port gets a ceremonial ribbon-cutting, Godi media races to declare victory. But beneath the symbolism lies strategic stagnation, diplomatic isolation, and a missed opportunity to collaborate with Bangladesh, the one actor truly positioned to mediate both humanitarian and economic interests in the region.

Unless India radically rethinks its Northeast and Myanmar strategy, opens serious talks with Bangladesh, and engages not just junta generals but ethnic actors and humanitarian stakeholders, the Kaladan corridor will remain what it has always been -- a mirage cloaked in ribbon-cutting ceremonies and amplified by Godi media spin.