From the Wiretap to the Torture Cell

A government that fears its citizens will always find a way to watch them. Under the Awami League, Bangladesh perfected that fear -- transforming the state into a machine that didn’t just listen to the people, but disappeared them.

What began with imported Israeli-linked spyware ended, for many, in the pitch-black hell of the Aynaghars --backed by a law that gave legal cover to digital repression: the Digital Security Act.

Step One: Spying Like a Police State

While loudly proclaiming democratic credentials, the Awami League quietly assembled one of the most intrusive surveillance arsenals in South Asia. No formal ties with Israel? No problem -- shell companies and intermediaries were used to acquire the hardware of repression.

2018: DGFI bought a P6 Intercept IMSI-catcher -- capable of hijacking and altering hundreds of phone calls   -- just one day after Gen. Aziz Ahmed became Army Chief. The deal was routed through Bangkok fixer James Moloney.

2019: NSI spent $3 million on a Wi-Fi interception system from Cyprus-based Prelysis, led by Israeli Kobi Naveh.

2019-21: NTMC and Military Intelligence procured a “Web Intelligence” platform and mobile tracking system from U-TX/Cognyte, tracking everything from search history to location pings.

2021-22: NTMC imported a “SpearHead” spy van from Passitora (ex-WiSpear, run by ex-Israeli intel chief Tal Dilian), with staff trained in Greece to extract data directly from devices in range.

Step Two: The Digital Security Act --The Legal Net

The Digital Security Act (DSA), passed in 2018, was the perfect legislative partner for this surveillance machine.

•    It criminalized “anti-state propaganda” and “hurting religious sentiment” online, with vague language that could mean anything the authorities wanted it to mean.

•    Journalists, cartoonists, students, and even ordinary citizens faced arrest for Facebook posts, memes, or private messages.

•    The spyware tools made sure the state could find those posts and messages -- even in supposedly private spaces.

Surveillance was the fishing rod; the DSA was the legal net to drag you in.

Step Three: Turning Data into Disappearances

Once the spyware and DSA had identified you, the next step was removal from public life. That’s where the Aynaghars -- the “houses of mirrors” -- came in.

A Sky News investigation pulled back the curtain on these secret DGFI and RAB-run black sites:

•    Detainees electrocuted on the genitals and tongue.

•    Mouths sewn shut with coarse thread.

•    Fingernails pried off with pliers.

•    Years of solitary confinement in pitch-dark cells.

Example: Opposition activist AKM Shahidul Islam was abducted in 2020 after posting videos about corruption. His family heard nothing for two years -- until regime change freed him from a cell near Dhaka airport. He emerged half-blind and unable to walk.

Example: University student Rumana Hossain led a protest over tuition fees. Months later, she was picked up, shown her own private chats in custody, and held for 11 months without charge -- exactly the kind of case where spyware, the DSA, and the Aynaghar system intersected.

After the Fall

The Aynaghars are gone. After Hasina’s fall, 500 to 700 secret detention cells were uncovered and demolished. The physical machinery of disappearance has been dismantled.

The spyware network, however, is different. We believe it has been switched off under the interim government. But being “off” is not the same as being gone. If the equipment still exists, it can be reactivated overnight by any future regime with the will to use it.

The Unanswered Question

The P6 Intercept, the Wi-Fi interceptors, the web monitoring platforms, the SpearHead spy van -- all bought with public money -- were the nervous system of this repression.

We need more than assurances that they are inactive. We need:

•    Physical dismantling: Destruction or disabling of interception hardware, server systems, and vehicles.

•    Legal decommissioning: Laws banning their domestic use, with no “national security” loopholes.

•    Independent verification: A public technical audit confirming their permanent removal.

A Call to the Interim Government

The interim government of Professor Muhammad Yunus, on whom the public has placed deep trust, must take this final step.

The Aynaghars were a visible wound, and dismantling them showed the world that this chapter was over. Now the hidden threat -- the surveillance arsenal -- must be dealt with just as decisively.

If these systems remain intact, Bangladesh will always live with the risk of their return.

Because Freedom Is More Than the Absence of Chains

The DSA showed how laws can be weaponized. The spyware showed how technology can be weaponized. And the Aynaghars showed how fear can be institutionalized.

The Aynaghars are gone. The spying has stopped. But until the surveillance systems are destroyed beyond recovery, the possibility of their abuse will hang over every citizen like a storm cloud.

A country that keeps the tools of repression intact is never safe from their return.